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LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
ATTORNEY'S FEES IN LOUISIANA PRODUCTS LIABILITY:
Philippe v. Browning Arms Co.
Dr. Doyle F. Philippe, a practicing dentist, was hunting with
friends in February, 1976, using a Browning Double Automatic Shot-
gun. After a short rest period, the doctor reached for the weapon
which he had left leaning against a log. The gun may have been
caught or obstructed by something, because Dr. Philippe encoun-
tered resistance when he attempted to lift the weapon. His hand slid
along the barrel and just as it reached the end, the gun discharged
and blew his right thumb off. This products liability suit was
brought against the foreign manufacturer, Fabrique Nationale, and
the importer, Browning Arms Company, alleging that a defective
safety mechanism on the gun had caused the accident and resultant
damages. The trial court awarded damages of $67 for medical bills,
$800,000 for loss of future earnings and $100,000 for pain and suffer-
ing. The defendants appealed, and Dr. Philippe answered with a re-
quest for attorney's fees under redhibition, plus additional punitive
damages. The court of appeals denied the punitive damages, but did
award him $25,000 in attorney's fees;' the supreme court denied at-
torney's fees.' A rehearing was granted and the supreme court re-
affirmed the awards given by both the trial court and the court of
appeals, including attorney's fees on the redhibition claim.'
The "American Rule" with regard to attorney's fees is that the
prevailing party in a civil action must pay his own attorney's fees.'
The "Louisiana Rule" is more specific: Attorney's, fees cannot be
recovered from any opposing litigant unless provided for by statute
or contract.5
Tort actions in Louisiana are based on Civil Code article 2315,
which does not specifically denote attorney's fees as a permissible
1. Philippe v. Browning Arms Co., 375 So. 2d 151 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
2. Philippe v. Browning Arms Co., 395 So. 2d 310 (La. 1980).
3. Philippe v. Browning Arms Co., 395 So. 2d 310 (La. 1981) (on rehearing).
4. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975);
Fleishmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967). In contrast, in
both the English and French legal systems, attorney's fees are routinely awarded by
the court to the prevailing litigant. Statute of Gloucester, 1278. 6 Edw. I, c.1. (plaintiff),
4 Jac. I, c.8 (1607) (defendant), and 17 Rich. II, c. 6 (1894) (equity courts); NEw CODE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE, Bk. 1, arts. 696, 699 & 700 (F. de Kerstrat & W. Crawford
trans. 1978); see also Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849 (1929).
5. See, e.g., Vines v. Vines, 379 So. 2d 1219 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980); Sorapura v.
Jeffers, 378 So. 2d 524 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979); Haacker v. Keith, 378 So. 2d 969 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1979); Shanklin v. Shanklin, 376 So. 2d 1036 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979).
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element of damages.' Despite the lack of a statute or contract pro-
viding for fee recovery, in an early property damage case, the trial
court awarded attorney's fees;' however, the appeals court reversed,
stating that "[t]he damages allowed are not excessive except in the
matter of attorney's fees which are not recoverable in a suit of this
character, where the act complained of is not tainted by fraud or
malice."' The implication is that. the court would have allowed the
award to stand if evidence had shown that the tort was intentional.
In Cooper v. Cappel,' the court did allow recovery of attorney's fees
by the successful plaintiff when the court found that his property
had been taken from him by force and that he should therefore be
compensated fully for the expense of litigation. 10 These early cases
proved to be aberrations; by 1899 the court declared that plaintiffs
attorney's fees are not ordinarily recoverable in tort actions, even
as punitive or exemplary damages;11 numerous subsequent decisions
have reinforced this last holding.18
The redhibition action is a sales remedy, whereby the purchaser
of a defective product can recover specified damages against the
good or bad faith seller.1" In 1968 the Louisiana legislature amended
6. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2315. "Every act whatever of man that causes damage to
another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it."
7. Eatman v. New Orleans Pac. Ry. Co., 35 La. Ann. 1018 (1883).
8. Id. at 1022 (emphasis added).
9. 29 La. Ann. 213 (1877).
10. Id. at 218. The court reasoned that
[iln a case like this there is no basis upon which the damages can be fixed with ab--
solute certainty; and the jury may well consider the trouble and expense to which
the plaintiffs have been subjected by the wrongful act of defendants; and it is
proper for them to take into account, as part of the expense, the reasonable fees
of attorneys .. . as an element of damages.
Id. at 218.
11. Bentley v. Fischer Lumber & Mfg. Co., 51 La. Ann. 451, 25 So. 262 (1899).
12. See, e.g., Kendrick v. Garrene, 233 La. 106, 96 So. 2d 58 (1957); Winkler v.
Ascension Bank & Trust Co., 182 La. 69, 161 So. 23 (1935) (the court stated the Loui-
siana rule, but found that a contractual provision would allow the plaintiff to recover
fees); Gay v. Gay, 378 So. 2d 609 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979); Evans v. Natchitoches Collec-
tions, Inc., 878 So. 2d 1037 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979); But see Newson v. Newson, 178 La.
699, 146 So. 473 (1933); Gauthreaux v. Gauthreaux, 315 So. 2d 402 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1975) (both suits to make alimony or child support payments in arrears executory).
Since these decisions, legislation has been enacted recognizing the validity ot such
awards. LA. R.S. 9:305 (Supp. 1977), as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 693, § 1 & 1979
La. Acts. No. 326, § 1.
13. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2520-48. The redhibition action has come a long way from
its historical roots, which involved, for the most part, the rescission of sales of slaves
and animals which were alleged to have vices or defects rendering them unsuitable to
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Civil Code article 254514 to include attorney's fees as an item of
damages when redhibition of a sale is claimed against a seller who
knows of the defect in the product sold and fails to declare it to the
buyer.'5 Because the redhibition articles deal with the breach of a
particular contractual relationship, the court has uniformly applied
Civil Code article 1934.1 This application has the effect of limiting
damages in redhibition actions to the amount of loss for the product
itself and profit loss and of denying non-consequential, non-pecuniary
damages such as mental anguish or loss of future income. 7 The two
the buyer. See, e.g., Gait v. Herndon, 16 La. App. 239, 133 So. 800 (2d Cir. 1931); Riggs
v. Duperrier, 19 La. 418 (1841); Blondeau v. Gales, 8 Mart. (0.5.) 313 (La. 1820). With
the industrial revolution, however, these rural transactions were gradually displaced
by those involving the purchasers of "lemons." See, e.g., Savoie v. Snell, 213 La. 823,
35 So. 2d 745 (1948); Wade v. McInnis-Peterson Chevrolet, Inc., 307 So. 2d 798 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1975); Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Bienemy, 244 So. 2d 275 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1971); Port Fin. Co. v. Campbell, 94 So. 2d 891 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
14. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2545: "The seller, who knows the vice of the thing he sells
and omits to declare it, besides the restitution of the price and repayment of expenses.
including reasonable attorney's fees, is answerable to the buyer in damages." This
legislation, introduced as House Bill 617 (La. H.B. 617, § 1, 31st Reg. Sess. (1968)), passed
the House by unanimous vote and the Senate with only eight dissenting votes. 1968
La. Acts, No. 84, § 1.
15. Since this amendment, many cases have awarded attorney's fees to the suc-
cessful plaintiff in redhibition actions. See, e.g., Alexander v. Burroughs Corp., 359 So.
2d 607 (La. 1978); Avoyelles Country Club, Inc., v. Walter Kidde & Co., 338 So. 2d 379
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1976); Aucoin v. Fontenot, 334 So. 2d 773 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976);
Schamens v. Crow, 326 So. 2d 621 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976); Gonzales v. Southwest
Mobile Homes, Inc., 309 So. 2d 780 (La. App. 3d Cir), writ denied, 313 So. 2d 239 (La.
1975); Fox v. Am. Steel Bldg. Co., Inc., 299 So. 2d 365 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
16. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1934: "Where the object of the contract is any thing but the
payment of money, the damages due to the creditor for its breach are the amount of
loss he has sustained and the profit of which he has been deprived .. " LA. Civ. CODE
art. 1778 states that "[c]ertain contracts are regulated by particular rules which are
established in the parts of the Code which treat of those contracts." The contract of
sale is one of these, as pointed out by Professor Levasseur in The Work of the Ap-
pellate Courts for the 1976-1977 Term -Sales, 38 LA. L. REv. 360, 361 (1978): "The sale
of any product, in a consumer protection-oriented society such as ours, immediately
triggers in one's mind the issue of warranty to such an extent that one may be led to
forget that a sale is first and foremost a convention or contract .. "
17. Meador v. Toyota, 332 So. 2d 433 (1976). The court interpreted Civil Code arti-
cle 1934(3) to preclude recovery of non-pecuniary damages unless the object of the con-
tract was primarily or exclusively intellectual gratification, as opposed to physical
gratification. LA. CiV. CODE art. 1934(3) provides: "Where the contract has for its ob-
ject the gratification of some intellectual enjoyment, whether in religion, morality or
taste, or some convenience or other legal gratification, although these are not ap-
preciated in money by the parties, yet damages are due for their breach." See Ostrowe
v. Darensbourg, 377 So. 2d 1201 (La. 1979 (the principal object of a contract to build
an architecturally designed home is not intellectual, therefore mental pain, anguish and
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theories, tort and redhibition, have thus been treated as separate
causes of action, each with specific remedies appropriate to one or
the other, but not to both. '
However, in the burgeoning field of products liability, a trend
toward convergence of the two theories has begun, in large part be-
cause the factual circumstances which give rise to a products liabil-
ity suit can contain elements of both tort and rehibition." In both, a
defective product" causes damage of some kind to the purchaser,"
anxiety damages are not recoverable); Gale v. Markey, 319 So. 2d 763 (La. App. 4th
Cir.) writ granted, 380 S. 2d 623 (La. 1979) (no recovery for mental anguish when a ceil-
ing collapsed because a lease does not have intellectual gratification as its principal ob-
ject), affd on other grounds, 387 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1980) (the court suggested that the rigid
tort/contract classification was not always necessary, but denied recovery because
mental anguish was not sufficiently proven). But see Schamens v. Crow, 326 So. 2d 621
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1976) (in addition to attorney's fees, the court awarded damages
under article 2545 for inconvenience, deprivation and embarrassment against the
builder of a house with an inadequate air conditioning system); Fox v. American Steel
Bldg. Co., Inc., 299 So. 2d 364 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974) (the plaintiff recovered the
replacement of a damaged crane system and doors, plus inconvenience, down time, cost
of additional work time and attorney's fees in an article 2545 redhibition action). For
an excellent discussion of Civil Code article 1934, see Comment, Damages "Ex Con-
tractu" Recovery of Nonpecuniary Damages for Breach of Contract Under Louisiana
Civil Code Article 1934, 48 TUL. L. REv. 1160 (1974).
18. See Percy, Products Liability-Tort or Contract or What?. 40 TUL. L. RED.
715 (1966). "A products liability case is either a tort or a sales case. As the song goes:
It's 'Gotta be This or That.'" Id. at 726.
19. Crawford, Products Liability-The Cause of Action, 22 LA. B.J. 239, (Mar.
1975); Robertson, Manufacturer's Liability for Defective Products in Louisiana Law,
50 TUL. L. REV. 50 (1975). See also Murray, Implied Warranty Against Latent Defects:
A Historical Comparative Law Study, 21 LA. L. REy. 586 (1961). "When one considers
the vendor's liability for consequential damages ...it becomes apparent that this
whole concept of an implied warranty against latent defects is now a hybrid of the law
of sales and torts ...." Id at 587.
20. Weber v. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co., 259 La. 599, 250 So. 2d 754 (1971) (tort ac-
tion in which a defective product is defined as one unreasonably dangerous to normal
use); LA. CIV. CODE art. 2520 (redhibitory defect defined as some vice which renders
the thing either absolutely useless, or its use so imperfect that it must be supposed
that the buyer would not have purchased it if he had known of the vice). Presumably,
no reasonable buyer would purchase something which he knows is unreasonably
dangerous to normal use; in this sense a tort "defect" is the same as a redhibition
"defect."
21. Weber v. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co., 259 La. 599, 250 So. 2d 754 (1971). "A manu-
facturer of a product which involves a risk of injury to the user is liable to any person,
whether the purchaser or a third person, who without fault on his part, sustains an in-
jury caused by a defect in the design, composition, or manufacture of the article ...."
Id. at 755. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 2545: "The seller, who knows the vice of the thing he
sells and omits to declare it, besides restitution of price and repayment of the ex-
penses, including reasonable attorney's fees, is answerable to the buyer in damages."
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and the manufacturer or seller of the product2" is held to have
breached -a duty2" to the consumer. The line between the two has
been drawn on the basis of the types of damage incurred and the
types of remedies available. 4
Early in the development of products liability tort law, the doc-
trine of constructive or imputed knowledge of defects was applied to
the manufacturer of a product."2 The nature and limitations of the
manufacturer's duty were defined in terms of implied warranty,
similar to those used in the redhibition articles." Redhibition,
Under both tort and redhibition actions, one's status as a purchaser carries with it the
right to recover from the manufacturer. The tort action also requires proof of causa-
tion to the extent that circumstantial evidence must indicate that the defect was the
most probable cause of the injury sustained. The redhibition action carries no similar
causation requirement; however, article 1934(2 imposes liability for "not only .. such
damages as were, or might have been foreseen at the time of making the contract, but
also . . .such as are the immediate and direct consequence of the breach of that con-
tract .. " Damages which are the "direct consequence" of a contractual breach could
also be described as "caused by" such breach; in this respect, both the tort and
redhibition actions require a minimal showing of a causal relationship between the
defect and the damage.
22. Media Prod. Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 262
La. 80, 262 So. 2d 377 (1972) (finding that Mercedes-Benz of North America occupied
the position of manufacturer and that the privity requirement should not preclude
recovery for breach of implied warranty, the court held Mercedes solidarily liable with
the vendor for the refund of the purchase price and expenses); Weber v. Fidelity &
Cas. Ins. Co., 259 La. 599, 250 So. 2d 754 (1971) (the manufacturer of the defective pro-
duct is liable).
23. Penn v. Inferno Mfg. Co., 199 So. 2d 21 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 251
La. 27, 202 So. 2d 649 (1967); LA. CiV. CODE arts. 2475 & 2476. In every contract of
sale, the seller must warrant the title or "peaceable possession" of the object of the
sale and also its freedom from redhibitory vices or defects.
24. Judge Redmann stated in Atchison v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., "'Products
liability' is but a catch-word, a descriptive categorization, like 'slip and fall' or 'medical
malpractice.' The liability that arises in any of these categories is the result of fault
causing damage; La. CC 2315." 360 So. 2d 599, 600 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978). Such a
categorization is not absolute, however, for according to Joseph Dainow, "lilt is neither
necessary nor correct to classify as ex delicto all actions which claim damages or which
allege negligence." The Work of the Appellate Courts for the 1965-1966 Term-Pre-
scription, 26 LA. L. REV. 459, 540 (1966).
25. Doyle v. Fuerst & Kraemer, Ltd., 129 La. 838, 56 So. 906 (1911).
The principle which governs in this case is that everyone ought to know the
qualities, good or bad, of the things which he fabricates .. .and that lack of such
knowledge is imputed to him as a fault, which makes him liable to the purchasers
of his fabrications for the damage resulting from the vices or defects thereof
which he did not make known to them and which they were ignorant of.
129 La. at 839, 56 So. at 907.
26. LeBlanc v. La. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 221 La. 919, 60 So. 2d 873 (1952); Mc-
Cauley v. Manda Bros. Provisions Co., Inc., 202 So. 2d 492 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967),
aff'd, 252 La. 528, 211 So. 2d 637 (1968); McAvin v. Morrison Cafeteria Co. of La., 85
So. 2d 63 (La. App. Or[. Cir. 1956).
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however, was limited to actions by the purchaser against his im-
mediate vendor;" so despite the similarities in the bases for liability,
these articles were not helpful to the consumer injured by a defec-
tively manufactured product in an action against the manufacturer.
Consequently, the only feasible remedy was in an action ex delicto;
since attorney's fees were not authorized in the articles dealing with
delictual liability,"8 successful litigants in products liability actions
were denied these fees as an element of damages."
In 1972 Media Production Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedez-Benz of
North America, Inc." extended the reach of the redhibition articles
to include the manufacturer's liability to the ultimate purchaser.,'
Applying the tort concept of presumptive knowledge of defects, the
court held in Rey v. Cuccia" that Civil Code article 2545 is appli-
cable to manufacturers and that manufacturers are liable with the
immediate vendor for attorney's fees-3 These decisions opened the
way for the potential combination of the two theories in a case con-
taining aspects of both tort and redhibition-a case in which a de-
fectively manufactured product causes damages in the nature of eco-
nomic loss and personal injury to the ultimate consumer. The literal
language of Civil Code article 2545 allows such a plaintiff to seek
reimbursement from "the seller"/manufacturer (Media)," "who
knows the vice of the thing he sells and omits to declare it," (Rey),"
27. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2520, 2522, 2530, 2538, 2539 & 2545. The articles are phrased
in terms of a direct buyer-seller relationship which is enforceable between the parties.
See generally Comment, Torts- The Emergence of Strict Liability in Products Cases.
26 LA. L. REv. 447 (1966). An early "chipping away" at the privity requirement began
in Weathermasters Parts & Serv., Inc. v. McKay; the court found a direct connection
between the manufacturer and the ultimate consumer in the form of the
manufacturer's warranty. 242 So. 2d 306 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
28. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2315-24.
29. Dubroc v. W.T. Grant & Co., 591 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1979); Chappuis v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 358 So. 2d 926 (La. 1978); Demars v. Natchitoches Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., Inc., 353 So. 2d 433 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 354 So. 2d 1384 (La. 1978).
30. 262 La. 80, 262 So. 2d 377 (1972).
31. See Note, "Manufacturer" Warranty in Louisiana, 33 LA. L. REV. 724 (1973).
32. 298 So. 2d 840 (La. 1974).
33. Id. at 847. This rationale was followed in Riche v. Krestview Mobile Homes,
Inc., 375 So. 2d 133 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
34. Ross v. John's Bargain Stores Corp., 464 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1972) (the court in-
dicated that both tort and redhibition theories of recovery were possible, but declined
to classify the action as one or the other); Smith v. Max Thieme Chevrolet Co., 315 So.
2d 82 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975) (Judge Dennis recognized the "conceptual difficulties in
this marriage of the modern consumer protection policy and the redhibition action ......
Id. at 86. See also Robertson, supra, note 19.
35. Media Prod. Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 262
La. 80, 262 So. 2d 377 (1972); LA. CIv. CODE art 2545.
36. Rey v. Cuccia, 298 So, 2d 840 (La. 1974); LA. Civ. CODE art. 2545.
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recovering, "besides the restitution of price and repayment of the
expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, . . . damages."
(Weber)."
Philippe" is just such a case." The Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the trial court's finding that "defects in the manufac-
ture and design of the safety mechanism caused the accident,""0 and
that Dr. Philippe's actions constituted neither contributory negli-
gence nor assumption of risk. On the issue of attorney's fees as an
item of damages, the court reasoned that, given Louisiana's proce-
dural rules allowing fact pleading," sufficient facts had been alleged
37. Weber v. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co., 259 La. 699, 250 So. 2d 754 (1971): LA. CIv.
CODE art 2545.
38. Philippe v. Browning Arms Co., 375 So. 2d 151 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
39. Several other cases with similar fact patterns had been heard by the Loui-
siana appellate courts, with varying results. In 1975, the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals denied attorney's fees in a personal injury suit brought against the manufacturer
of a defective automobile, but made it clear that the basis of the denial was that "the
question of attorney fees against the manufacturer was not raised until after the case
was submitted to the trial court for decision. . . " thus not giving fair notice in the
pleadings to the manufacturer that this recovery would be sought. Townsend v. Cleve
Heyl Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., 318 So. 2d 618, 624 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975). Also in 1975,
the Third Circuit Court of Appeal denied attorney's fees in a products liability case in-
volving personal injuries: "[The plaintiff] ... seeks only damages [incurred] as a result of
injuries.... He does not seek rescission of the sale nor reduction in price." Gordon v.
General Motors Corp., 323 So. 2d 496, 505 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975). The clear implication
of this narrow holding is that had the plaintiff satisfied these elements of a redhibitory
cause of action, the court might have allowed the fees. Faced with this decision in
Reeves v. Great AtL & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., the same court carefully distinguished the
personal injury claim of the child injured by broken glass in a bottled drink from his
mother's redhibition claim for the 45 cent cost of the drink. The court awarded $1500
in attorney's fees, with the ingenious disclaimer that the award was only for the
redhibition aspects of the case and should not be interpreted as an award in the tort
action. 370 So. 2d 202 (La. App. 8d Cir.), writs denied, 371 So. 2d 835 (La. 1979) and 372
So. 2d 568 (La. 1979). Harris tv. Bardwell illustrates this precise fact pattern. 373 So.
2d 777 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979). In Harris, a defectively manufactured and installed boat
pedestal seat came loose and threw the owner/buyer of the boat into the water.
Damages awarded included $75.000 for personal injuries, $100,000 for loss of future
earnings, and $12,500 for redhibition attorney's fees. The court justified combining tort
and redhibition damages by stating that "[rJecovery under one theory should not
preclude recovery under another theory where the circumstances warrant." Id. at 784.
Harris v. Bardwell had not been reported when Philippe was argued before the same
court.
40. Philippe v. Browning Arms Co., 375 So. 2d 151, 155 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
41. Id. at 155. The court thus avoided reaching a conclusion as to whether con-
tributory negligence and assumption of risk are valid defenses in a products liability
case involving defects in design or manufacture.
42. Id. at 156. Though not cited in the opinion, the applicable procedural articles
are articles 854, 862, 891 & 1841 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
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to establish a cause of action for the damages described in Civil
Code article 2545. The court reached this conclusion even though the
rescission of the sale and refund of the purchase price had not bpen
formally requested by the plaintiff in his pleadings. This finding
seems to ignore prior jurisprudence which had required the pleas
for rescission of the sale and return of or reduction of the price as
integral parts of the redhibition action." The redhibition action is
highly structured and described with great specificity in the appro-
priate articles of the Civil Code; a significant body of jurisprudence
has further refined and delineated its requirements." Perhaps re-
quiring such detail in a "fact pleading" system i8 anomalous;' 5 never-
theless, the court should have addressed these requirements more
directly before applying article 2545.
43. See, e.g., Gustin v. Shows, 377 So, 2d 1825 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979) (the
pleadings were sufficient to establish a cause of action, but prescription had run
against the "good faith" seller): Avoyelles Country Club, Inc. v. Walter Kidde & Co.,
338 So. 2d 379 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976); Gordon v. General Motors Corp., 323 So. 2d 496
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1975), discussed in note 39, supra.
44. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2520-48. Article 2521 requires that the defect be non-
apparent. Demars v. Natchitoches Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc., 353 So. 2d 488 (La.
App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 354 So. 2d 1384 (La. 1978). Article 2522 states that if latent
defects were declared to the buyer, the redhibition action cannot be brought. Matt v.
Laperouse, 371 So. 2d 1284 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979). Article 2530 requires that the
buyer prove that the vice existed before the sale was made. Penton v. Budget Rent-A-
Car, 304 So. 2d 410 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973); Sinquefield v. Yates, 197 So. 2d 395 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1967). Article 2534 establishes a one-year prescriptive period for the ac-
tion which commences at the time of sale and applies only to good faith sellers. Gustin
v. Shows, 377 So. 2d 1325 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979); Weaver v. Fleetwood Homes, 327
So. 2d 172 (La. App. 3d..Cir. 1976). The action against bad faith sellers can be brought
at any time within a year after discovery of the defect. Aucoin v. Fontenot, 334 So. 2d
773 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976). The jurisprudence has uniformly held that the buyer must
tender a return of the thing to the good faith seller: this requirement is not necessary
when the seller is in bad faith or when tender is not possible. See Andrews v. Hensler,
73 U.S. 254 (1867); Rausch v. Hanberry, 377 So. 2d 901 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979): Riche
v. Krestview Mobile Homes, Inc., 375 So. 2d 133 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979); Alan Randal
Co. v. Quality Oil Co., 100 So. 2d 282 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958). Another jurisprudential
rule is that prescription does not begin to run against the buyer until all repair efforts
have ceased. Schamens v. Crow, 326 So. 2d 621 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976); Motorola Avia-
tion Elec., Inc. v. La. Aircraft, Inc., 172 So. 2d 118 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965). See also
Note, Incidents to Redhibition Actions Under Civil Code Article 2531, 37 LA. L. REV.
1274 (1977).
45. Courts often ignore the plaintiffs characterization of an action and instead
find sufficient facts alleged to sustain a different cause of action carrying different
remedies or different prescriptive periods. Usually, such judicial manipulations allow
the plaintiff to recover. See, e.g., Royal Furniture Co. v. Benton, 256 So. 2d 614 (La.
1972); Demars v. Natchitoches Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc., 353 So. 2d 433 (La. App. 3d
Cir.), writ denied, 352 So. 2d 1384 (La. 1978); Castille v. Flock. 308 So. 2d 328 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1976); Kegler's, Inc. v. Levy, 239 So. 2d 450 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
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Relying also on its holding in Harris v. Bardwell," the court of
appeal stated that article 2545 "damages" do not "exclude personal
injury damages which are factually and legally caused by the defec-
tive thing.""' In Harris, the problem presented by the limitations in
Civil Code article 1934 was dismissed on the grounds that this arti-
cle does not apply to multiple theories of recovery,S nor is it directly
applicable in its entirety to bad faith situations."
However, the Louisiana Supreme Court found in its first hearing
that article 1934 precluded "recovery of non-pecuniary damages in
suits arising in contract."'" The court accepted the defendant's argu-
ment that the redhibition action is contractual in nature because it
is founded on breach of implied warranty and is therefore limited by
article 1934." This reasoning ignores two factors: (1) The breach of
implied warranty also served as the basis for products liability ac-
tions "ex delicto" for many years,' and (2) no distinction was drawn
by the court between the application of article 1934 to bad faith as
contrasted to good faith sellers."
In response to the "fact pleading" issue, the supreme court first
took note of the elaborate statutory scheme set out by the redhibi-
tion articles' and then stated: "[A lthough a plaintiff is not required
to restrict himself to one theory for recovery, the courts must...
characterize the cause of action so as to determine the appropriate
standard for recovery."" The language of this statement would seem
46. 873 So. 2d 777 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
47. Id at 784..
48. Id See also Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Application for Rehearing in
Behalf of Dr. Doyle F. Philippe, Plaintiff-Appellee-Respondent, Win. E. Crawford.
Amicus Curiae, at 1-3, [hereinafter cited as Amicus Curiae].
49. This reasoning may be circular, because .the clear intent of the Meador inter-
pretation of article 1934 is to categorize the types of damages available in contract ac-
tions and thereby to eliminate "tort-type" damages. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1934. Meador v.
Toyota, 332 So. 2d 483 (La. 1976) (note particularly the discussion at 436 n.9 and at 438,
in which these types of damages are specifically excluded from recovery under article
1934). Perhaps a more satisfactory resolution could be achieved through application of
the concept of "moral damages," as described in Litvinoff, Moral Damages, 38 LA. L.
REV. 1, 6-13 (1977), reprinted in S. LITVINOFF, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS IN THE LoU-
SIANA JURISPRUDENCE 457-61 (1979). For a more extensive discussion of this concept,
see Note, Moral Damages for Breach of Contract The Effect on Recovery of an
Obligor's Bad Faith, 42 LA. L. REV. - (1981).
50. Philippe v. Browning Arms Co.. 395 So. 2d 310, 313 (La. 1981).
51. Id
62. See cases cited in note 22, supra.
53. See Amicus Curiae. supra note 48. at 1-3.
64. Philippe v. Browning Arms Co., 395 So. 2d at 313.
85. IS No standards or tests upon which this characterization is based were
established or mentioned by the court; therefore, the hearing did not clarify this recur-
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to eliminate the "multiple theories" of recovery approach used by
the lower court," but the actual holding was qualified in such a way
that the theory may have survived intact. The court held that "in
this case, in which rescission of the sale was not sought by plaintiff,
but only damages arising from his personal injuries, attorney's fees
under Article 2545 are not payable.""
On rehearing, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed its initial
holding on the award of attorney's fees and re-affirmed the court of
appeals decision on this issue." In so doing, the court specifically re-
ring problem. In the past when two theories of recovery were available, the plaintiff
was uncertain of whether he was to elect a theory or whether the court should assign
a classification. The court's custorary statement is that the character of the action as
revealed by the pleadings determines the classification. But this phrase says nothing
about how the court actually determines which classification is appropriate. See
Loew's, Inc. v. Don George, Inc., 237 La. 132, 110 So. 2d 553 (1959). See, e.g., Harper v.
Metairie Country Club, 258 La. 264, 246 So. 2d 8 (1971) (the court classified a sub-
contractor's negligent conduct as a breach of contract); American Heating & Plumbing
Co. v. West End Country Club, 171 La. 482, 131 So. 466 (1930) (plaintiff may opt to sue
either on the tort or contract); State ex rel. Guste v. Chemical Applicators of
Lafayette, Inc., 379 So. 2d 1199 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980) (plaintiff has option of choosing
tort or contract action when he has been damaged by conduct arising out of contract);
Williams v. Lucien J. Caruso, Inc., 374 So. 2d 113 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979) (the
plaintiff's carefully drawn petition alleged "badness" of workmanship in a house,
thereby avoiding the one-year prescriptive period of art. 2545 and availing himself to
the ten-year prescriptive period of art. 2762): Weathermasters Parts & Serv., Inc. v.
McCay, 242 So. 2d 306 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970) (the court characterized an action for
damages arising out of an unserviceable replacement air-conditioning compressor as a
breach of an implied warranty); Victory Oil Co. v. Perret, 183 So. 2d 360 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), writ denied, 249 La. 65, 184 So. 2d 735 (1966) (the court classified a suit for
damages arising out of the delivery of oil poorer in qualilty than specified as a breach
of contract). See generally Comment, Prescription, Classification & Concurrence of
Obligations, 36 TUL. L. REv. 556 (1962).
56. Philippe v. Browning Arms Co., 375 So. 2d 151, 156 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979);
Harris v. Bardwell, 373 So. 2d 777, 784 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
57. Philippe v. Browning Arms Co. 395 So. 2d at 313 (emphasis added). An addi-
tional holding, not discussed in this note, concerns the manner in which the plaintiff's
wife's income was computed in the damages. The supreme court in the first hearing
remanded for the wife's contribution to be subtracted from her husband's future earn-
ings in order to more accurately reflect his earnings loss, because she had worked
without salary as a receptionist in his office. On rehearing, this portion of the decision
was declared erroneous. Philippe v. Browning Arms Co., 395 So. 2d at 316. See note
58, infra.
58. "On reconsideration we further conclude that we erred on original hearing in
denying attorney's fees against the manufacturer." Philippe v. Browning Arms Co., 395
So. 2d at 318. The supreme court clarified its previous calculations of damages for loss
of future earning capacity, affirming the award of $800,000 granted by the trial court.
The wife's contribution to Dr. Philippe's annual income was included in the projections
of the experts who testified, was discussed extensively by the trial judge, and was
taken into consideration when the award was made. Thus the decision was not an
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jected any actual or implied requirement of "pleading the theory of
the case" which its original decision may have imposed." By thus af-
firming the court of appeals decision, the supreme court gave im-
plicit recognition to the validity of the "multiple theories of
recovery" approach used by the second circuit.' ° Further, the court
found "no compelling reason to require a person injured by a defec-
tive product he has purchased to proceed either in contract or ii
tort," thereby eliminating the necessity for the plaintiff to choose a
theory which might limit his recovery. In fact, the court did not find
classifying the action necessary in order to reach its decision.
The supreme court analyzed the duty of the manufacturer to the
consumer by applying the standard of conduct found in the Civil
Code articles on sales, particularly articles 2476 and 2545.2 The
manufacturer's duty encompasses both the warranty against hidden
defects and a duty to warn of such defects."2 According to these ar-
ticles, the manufacturer who breaches these duties is clearly respon-
sible for attorney's fees.
The manufacturer's additional responsibility for delictual
damages arising from the same defect, however, has been less ob-
vious in past jurisprudence. 4 Philippe may clear the way for the re-
covery of a combination of non-pecuniary as well as pecuniary dam-
ages in future contract or sales actions, despite past contrary indica-
tions found in the Meador line of cases." The rationale given by the
court for this combination is a model of brevity, but hardly of clar-
abuse of the trial judge's "much discretion" and was reaffirmed on rehearing. Id at
817.
59. 395 So. 2d at 318.
60. Philippe v. Browning Arms Co., 375 So. 2d 151 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979); Harris
v. Bardwell, 373 So. 2d 777 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979). A potential cumulation of actions
problem raised by the varying definitions of "action" in articles 421, 424. 461 and 934
of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure was neatly side-stepped by the second circuit
in Harri. Judge Marvin defined a "true cumulation" as one in which the plaintiffs
grounds for recovery have separate factual circumstances. In both Harris and
Philippe, therefore, the court did not have to address the cumulation issue, since both
cases involved a single factual circumstance which gave rise to multiple claims or
theories of recovery.
61. Philippe v. Browning Arms Co., 395 So. 2d at 319 (La. 1981).
62. 395 So. 2d at 318. Article 2476 imposes upon the seller an obligation of war-
ranty against hidden defects in his product, and article 2545 makes such a seller liable
for damages and attorney's fees if he fails to warn the buyer of a known vice or defect
in his product.
63. 895 So. 2d at 318.
64. See discussion and cases at notes 16-18, supra.
65. Meador v. Toyota, 332 So. 2d 433 (La. 1976).
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ity. The court stated simply that "(tihe seller's (manufacturer's) act
of delivering a defective thing, when he knows of the defect, gives
rise to delictual, as well as contractual, liability."" No discussion of
Civil Code article 1934 appears in the decision; no attempt is made
to distinguish Meador." Therefore this decision answers affirmatively
the question of whether tort damages can be combined with redhibi-
tion damages when a single set of factual circumstances gives rise to
both. But Philippe left unanswered the larger question of whether
tort damages are also available when combined with other types of
contractual claims for pecuniary damages. The broad language used
suggests that the "multiple theories of recovery" analysis can be
used in future cases to combine contract and tort damages in situa-
tions other than products liability claims. This approach would ex-
tensively broaden the possible recoveries for breach of contract.
However, tort damages will not be broadened by the inclusion of
attorney's fees in all cases. The Louisiana rule still applies, and the
successful plaintiff will still have to find a specific statutory
justification in order to recover attorney's fees in a tort action." In
Philippe and other products liability cases, that justification is found
in Civil Code article 2545.
If Philippe is narrowly interpreted in future decisions as ap-
plicable solely to products liability cases, its impact on contract law
can be mitigated. However, the decision may skew sales law by en-
couraging "combination" actions for the sake of increased attorney's
fees. Almost every tort claim involves an instrumentality (product)
of some kind in the chain of causation. If all of these are characterized
as tort/redhibition combinations, the clear purpose of the redhibition
action will become blurred.0 A few such attempts have occurred
since article 2545 was amended;" . however, Philippe adds impetus to
66. Philippe v. Browning Arms Co., 395 So. 2d at 319.
67. Article 1934(3) was cited, however, when the court gave deference to the
"much discretion of the trial court judge." 395 So. 2d at 317.
68. Meador v. Toyota, 332 So. 2d 433 (La. 1976).
69. See text and cases at note 5. supra.
70. In 1969, the first year after article 2545 was amended, Mervin v. D.H. Holmes
Co., 228 So. 2d 878 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969) illustrated this tendency to classify the ac-
tion as lying in redhibition in order to recover attorney's fees, despite an obvious dif-
ference between the facts and this cause of action. A redhibition claim was brought
against the seller of a car wash product when the buyer's minor child was injured by
ingesting some of the product. Obviously, the product itself was not defective when used
as intended, and the court found no duty to warn of an unknown and unforeseeable
situation not attributable to any hidden defect.
71. Id.
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this tendency by its lack of emphasis on the precise steps necessary
to bring a redhibition action. 2 Louisiana courts will have to reiter-
ate some of these formal requirements in order to keep the redhi-
bition statutes sharply defined.
Whether broadly or narrowly interpreted, however, Philippe v.
Browning Arms Co. is a milestone in both tort and redhibition law
in Louisiana. Philippe synthesizes the two procedurally, and adds
substantive weight to the increasingly important area of products
liability.
Lois E. Hawkins
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON PATRONAGE PRACTICE:
Branti v. Finkel
Defendant, the newly-appointed Democratic Public Defender of
Rockland County, New York, attempted to dismiss the plaintiffs, two
Republican' assistant public defenders. In an attempt to retain their
jobs plaintiffs sought an injunction,' alleging that the sole reason for
the attempted discharges was their political affiliation.? On appeal,
the United States Supreme Court held that the discharge of an
72. Philippe v. Browning Arms Co., 395 So. 2d at 318 n.13 (La. 1981). Compare
this language with the precise scheme discussed at notes 43-45, supra.
1. Plaintiff Finkel switched his party registration from Republican to Democrat
in 1977 in an apparent attempt to improve his chances of being retained when a new
Democratic public defender was appointed. This move failed; the Supreme Court found
that the parties still regarded Finkel as a Republican.
2. Suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976).
3. As Republicans, the plaintiffs were unable to obtain the recommendation or
sponsorship of a Democratic legislator or chairperson, and the defendant Branti sought
to replace them with persons who had such sponsorship. Branti also attempted to
argue that he would have fired the plaintiffs anyway because they were incompetent,
but the Court found the district court's finding that the plaintiffs were satisfactorily
performing their jobs was supported adequately by the record. 445 U.S. 507, 512, at
n.6. Under Mount Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), a plaintiff
seeking to prove dismissal for the exercise of his first amendment rights must show
that he would not have been dismissed "but for" the protected conduct. For lower
court discussions of the Mount Healthy City burden of proof in a patronage dismissal
case see Rosaly v. Ignacio, 593 F.2d 145 (1st Cir. 1979); Miller v. Board of Educ. of Lin-
coln, 450 F. Supp. 106 (S.D. W. Va. 1978); Tanner v. McCall, 441 F. Supp. 503 (M.D.
Fla. 1977). aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 625 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1980); Lasco v. Koch, 428
F. Supp. 468 (S.D. I1. 1977).
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